There is a body of evidence that shows their political and electoral behaviour is no different from that of any other community, says Yogendra Yadav 
The belief is that the Indian Muslim harbours a deep sense of alienation vis-À-vis the political system and feels excluded from the democratic mainstream.
This view assumes that Muslims are an extraordinary political community, distinct and internally monolithic. Some of these assumptions conflict with others. Yet, there is something about modern India and Islam that generates political myth making.
The supposition is that unlike other social groups, divisions of region, class, age, gender and caste either do not matter or play a very secondary role in shaping the politics of the Indian Muslims. These perceptions are shared by a wide section: Muslims and non-Muslims, political activists and laypeople. Like all stereotypes, they contain an element of truth which is distorted and blown out of all proportion.
Let us examine each of the five beliefs in the light of the available evidence. The impression that the community turns out in large numbers to vote stems from the fact that constituencies with a high concentration of Muslims (above 30 per cent) tend to have a higher turnout. But this is largely due to communal polarisation, a phenomenon that leads both Muslims and Hindus to vote in larger numbers. In any case, the number of such constituencies is very small. Muslims constitute 13.4 per cent of the country’s population, and perhaps make up a smaller percentage of the electoral roll. Most Muslims live in constituencies where they do not account for even 10 per cent of the electorate.
Election studies The evidence gathered by the National Election Studies (NES) carried out by CSDS shows that the Muslim turnout is not very different from the rest of the electors. In the last four general elections, the turnout among Muslims was 59 per cent while the all-India figure was 60 per cent. In fact, the figures in 2004 suggest the turnout among Muslims was much lower than average.
When it comes to more active forms of engagement such as participation in election campaigns, there is virtually nothing that separates Muslims from Hindus or indeed from any other religious minority. Education and class are factors that play a role here, but not religion. Muslims are as likely to declare themselves members of a party or identify with a political party (though a little more likely to dislike a party) as Hindus.
The evidence on Muslim voting preference in general elections does not validate the image of Muslims as a ‘vote bank.’ In 2004, the Congress and its allies got 53 per cent of the Muslim vote while the BJP and its allies got about 11 per cent. The other big vote-getter outside these two was the Samajwadi Party at 16 per cent. That is hardly en bloc voting.
If we go down to the State level, we find that the Muslim vote tends to consolidate. Still, nowhere near enough to suggest they vote en bloc. Muslims resort to en bloc voting only in States such as Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi when faced with situations of no-choice, when the real competition is between the Congress and the BJP. The Muslim support for the Congress goes down in States such as Andhra Pradesh and Assam, where there is a third option. So does it in Kerala and West Bengal, where the BJP or its allies are not real competitors.
In general, the pattern of Muslim voting at the State level is similar to that of a large caste such as the Jats or Brahmins.
Again, there is little evidence to support the third and the fourth beliefs that Muslim voters are influenced by considerations that set them apart from others. Like everyone else, Muslim voters are first of all influenced by the party, then by the candidate, followed by such things as caste.
Muslim men and women are as influenced by clerics or others in deciding who to vote for as any other section of the population. As for making up their minds about who to vote for, Muslims are no more ‘strategic’ than others. Thirty-three per cent of Hindus surveyed said they made up their mind on the polling day or the day before that; the corresponding figure for Muslims was 31 per cent.
Finally, on the question of democracy, the voting pattern in India provides solid evidence against the prevailing Islamophobia.
Clearly, Indian Muslims are not opting out of democratic politics. There is no difference whatsoever between Hindus and Muslims in their stated support for democracy. This is borne out by the evidence from the NES 2004 and is supported by that in the State of Democracy in South Asia, a five-country comparison carried out by the CSDS.
The evidence showing up these five beliefs as myths should be placed along with two well documented set of facts about Indian Muslims. The first set was brought home starkly by the Sachar Committee Report. It showed that Muslims are the not merely disadvantaged, but are also often a discriminated minority when it comes to education, employment, housing and economic opportunity.
Muslim representation The second piece of information has been unearthed by an impressive analysis of the Muslim MPs and MLAs by Professor Iqbal Ansari. His data shows that, barring 1980 and 1984, Muslim representation has been less than half their share of the population. At the State level too, the proportion of Muslim representatives has been around half or less of their population share.
The proportion improves in those States (Kerala, Assam, West Bengal) where there are concentrated pockets of Muslims or where there are parties that represent the community such as the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) in Kerala, the Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF) in Assam and the Samajwadi Party (SP) in Uttar Pradesh. The proportion drops dramatically in States such as Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat where the Muslim population is dispersed and the BJP constitutes one pole of a bipolar political system.
Dovetail the five myths and these two facts about Muslim politics and we begin to see the political tragedy of the Indian Muslim. Like the African-American population in the United States, they are a neglected constituency. In that country, the Republicans are not keen to do anything to improve their lot as they know they won’t get the black vote. As for the Democrats, they don’t do very much either for they know they will get their votes all the same. The myth about a homogenous Muslim vote bank serves to keep the Muslim community as a political hostage — earlier one of the Congress and now one of the Congress and regional parties such as the SP and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD).
Against this background, the 2009 elections offer an opening for Indian Muslims. In many States, newer formations are coming up to challenge the monopoly of established claimants to the Muslim ‘vote bank.’ The AUDF in Assam is challenging the monopoly of the Congress, the Milli Council in Uttar Pradesh is challenging the SP, the RJD is faced with the rise of pasmanda (backward) Muslim politics in Bihar, and the IUML faces the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Kerala.
True, much of this challenge comes from the quarter of what can be called regressive and communal politics. Many of these new formations may prove to be short lived and opportunistic.
But in a way, their existence and growth represent a desire in the community to break away from being treated like a political hostage and to address its economic backwardness.
[This article draws upon an ongoing research project in collaboration with Dr. Sanjeer Alam and Dr. Hilal Ahmed]
